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Ransomware Negotiation & Recovery Playbook

CRITICAL — Executive-Level Decision Required

This playbook supplements IR-PB-001 (Ransomware Incident Playbook). It activates when containment is complete and the organization faces a pay/don't-pay decision. Negotiation is a stalling tactic to buy recovery time — not an endorsement of payment. Never pay without legal counsel, executive authorization, and OFAC sanctions screening.

Metadata

Field Value
Playbook ID IR-PB-007
Severity Critical (P1)
RTO — Containment < 4 hours (see IR-PB-001)
RTO — Recovery < 120 hours (5 days)
Owner IR Lead + General Counsel (joint)
Escalation IR Lead → CISO → General Counsel → CEO → Board (if material)
Prerequisite IR-PB-001 containment phase must be complete before activating this playbook
Last Reviewed 2026-03-22

Severity Classification Matrix

Factor Low (P3) Medium (P2) High (P1) Critical (P0)
Systems Encrypted < 10 endpoints, non-critical 10-50 endpoints, limited business impact 50-500 endpoints, business-critical systems Domain controllers, backup infrastructure, >500 endpoints
Data Exfiltration No evidence of exfiltration Exfiltration claimed, unverified Exfiltration confirmed, internal data Exfiltration confirmed, regulated data (PII/PHI/PCI)
Backup Availability Clean backups available, tested Backups available, untested Partial backups, integrity uncertain Backups encrypted or destroyed
Business Impact Minor operational disruption Moderate disruption, workarounds available Significant disruption, revenue impact Complete operational halt, existential risk
Regulatory Exposure No notification required Internal reporting only Sector regulator notification required Multi-jurisdiction mandatory notification + litigation risk

RACI — Roles & Responsibilities

Activity IR Lead CISO Legal CEO/Exec Finance External Negotiator Forensics Comms/PR
Activate negotiation playbook R A C I I I I
Engage external negotiation firm C A R A C
OFAC/sanctions screening I C A I R C
Negotiation communications I C C I R C
Pay/don't-pay decision C C C A R C C
Cryptocurrency procurement I C A R C
Decryptor testing & validation R I I C R
Recovery execution A I I R
External communications I C A A R
Post-incident legal review C C A I C I R I

R = Responsible, A = Accountable, C = Consulted, I = Informed


Trigger Conditions

Activate this playbook when ALL of the following are true:

  • [ ] IR-PB-001 containment phase is complete (active encryption halted)
  • [ ] Ransom demand has been received (note, dark web portal, email, or phone)
  • [ ] Scope of encrypted systems and data exfiltration has been assessed
  • [ ] Backup availability and integrity have been evaluated

AND any of the following:

  • [ ] Clean backups are unavailable, incomplete, or untested for critical systems
  • [ ] Threat actor claims data exfiltration with evidence (file listings, sample data)
  • [ ] Business continuity is at risk without decryption capability
  • [ ] Regulatory exposure from exfiltrated data requires threat actor engagement to assess scope

Decision Tree

flowchart TD
    A([Ransomware Containment Complete\nDemand Received]) --> B{Are verified clean\nbackups available for\nALL critical systems?}
    B -- Yes --> C[Begin parallel recovery\nfrom backups — DO NOT\nengage threat actor yet]
    B -- No/Partial --> D{Is there evidence\nof data exfiltration?}
    B -- Unknown --> E[Assess backup integrity\nwithin 4 hours]
    E --> B

    C --> F{Recovery feasible\nwithin RTO?}
    F -- Yes --> G[Full backup recovery\nNo negotiation needed]
    F -- No --> D

    D -- "Yes — confirmed" --> H{Does exfiltrated data\ncontain regulated\ninformation?}
    D -- "Claimed only" --> I[Engage negotiator to\nverify exfiltration claims\nBuy time for recovery]
    D -- No --> J{Can the organization\ntolerate data loss\nfrom unrecoverable systems?}

    H -- Yes --> K[MANDATORY: Engage\nlegal + external negotiator\nOFAC screening required]
    H -- No --> I

    I --> L{OFAC/sanctions\nscreening clear?}
    K --> L

    J -- Yes --> G
    J -- No --> I

    L -- Clear --> M{Executive pay/don't-pay\ndecision gate}
    L -- "Sanctioned Entity" --> N[DO NOT PAY\nEngage law enforcement\nPursue recovery alternatives]

    M -- Pay --> O[Procure cryptocurrency\nExecute payment\nObtain decryptor]
    M -- "Don't Pay" --> P[Accept data loss\nFull rebuild from\nclean state]

    O --> Q[Test decryptor on\nisolated system first]
    Q --> R{Decryptor works?}
    R -- Yes --> S[Staged decryption\nwith integrity checks]
    R -- No --> T[Re-engage negotiator\nDemand working decryptor]
    T --> Q

    S --> U([Recovery Complete\nLessons Learned])
    G --> U
    P --> U
    N --> U

Phase 1 — Demand Assessment & Intelligence (0–4 Hours)

All threat actor names, wallet addresses, and communication examples below are 100% synthetic. Never use real threat actor identifiers.

1.1 Ransom Demand Documentation

Immediately document the ransom demand with full detail:

  • [ ] Photograph/screenshot the ransom note (do not interact with embedded links yet)
  • [ ] Record: demanded amount, currency, payment deadline, contact method
  • [ ] Identify threat actor group (if named) — cross-reference with threat intelligence
  • [ ] Document the communication channel (Tor site, email, chat portal)
  • [ ] Preserve all artifacts for law enforcement
Demand Element Details Notes
Threat actor alias _____ Synthetic example: "DarkVault Collective"
Demanded amount _____ Note: initial demand is almost always negotiable
Currency BTC / XMR / Other Monero demands complicate tracing
Payment deadline _____ Deadlines are psychological pressure — usually flexible
Contact method Tor portal / email / chat Document the exact URL/address
Double extortion? Yes / No Data leak threat in addition to encryption
Triple extortion? Yes / No DDoS or customer/partner notification threats
Proof of exfiltration File listing / sample data Verify authenticity — could be fabricated

1.2 Threat Actor Intelligence

// Correlate threat actor IOCs from ransom note with historical telemetry
let RansomIOCs = datatable(indicator:string, type:string) [
    "203.0.113.45", "IP",
    "c2-beacon.synth-ransom.example.com", "Domain",
    "a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2", "SHA256"
];
// Check network connections to known C2
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| join kind=inner (RansomIOCs | where type == "IP") on $left.RemoteIP == $right.indicator
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp asc

// Identify initial access timeline
DeviceLogonEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where LogonType in ("RemoteInteractive", "Network")
| where RemoteIP !startswith "10." and RemoteIP !startswith "192.168."
| summarize FirstSeen=min(Timestamp), LastSeen=max(Timestamp), LogonCount=count()
    by RemoteIP, AccountName, DeviceName
| order by FirstSeen asc
// Correlate threat actor IOCs with historical network data
index=firewall sourcetype=pan:traffic
| where dest_ip IN ("203.0.113.45", "198.51.100.22")
    OR query IN ("c2-beacon.synth-ransom.example.com")
| stats earliest(_time) AS first_seen, latest(_time) AS last_seen, count BY src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port
| sort first_seen

// Identify initial access — unusual RDP/VPN logins in 30-day window
index=auth sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=10
| where NOT cidrmatch("10.0.0.0/8", Source_Network_Address)
    AND NOT cidrmatch("192.168.0.0/16", Source_Network_Address)
| stats earliest(_time) AS first_logon, count BY Source_Network_Address, Account_Name, ComputerName
| sort first_logon

1.3 OFAC Sanctions Screening

Paying a sanctioned entity is a federal crime (USA) and can trigger enforcement actions. Screen BEFORE any payment decision.

  • [ ] Cross-reference threat actor alias with OFAC SDN list
  • [ ] Cross-reference any known wallet addresses with blockchain analysis providers
  • [ ] Check FBI/CISA advisories for attribution to sanctioned nation-state groups
  • [ ] Document screening results — retain for compliance records regardless of pay/don't-pay decision
  • [ ] If sanctioned: STOP — do not pay under any circumstances — engage legal and law enforcement
Screening Check Source Result Date
OFAC SDN List treasury.gov/ofac Clear / Match __
Blockchain analysis Chainalysis / Elliptic Clear / Match __
FBI Flash Alert ic3.gov No advisory / Advisory exists __
CISA Advisory cisa.gov/stopransomware No advisory / Advisory exists __
EU Sanctions List sanctionsmap.eu Clear / Match __

1.4 Law Enforcement Notification

  • [ ] Report to FBI IC3: https://ic3.gov (USA) or relevant national CERT
  • [ ] Report to CISA: https://cisa.gov/report
  • [ ] Contact local FBI field office if double extortion involves regulated data
  • [ ] Notify cyber insurance carrier — most policies require prompt notification
  • [ ] Document all law enforcement case numbers and points of contact

Phase 2 — Negotiation Strategy (4–24 Hours)

Negotiation is primarily a time-buying tactic to enable parallel recovery efforts. Even if you intend to pay, negotiation typically reduces the demand by 40-60%.

2.1 Engage External Negotiation Firm

  • [ ] Contact ransomware negotiation firm (pre-contracted or via insurance panel)
  • [ ] Provide: ransom note, threat actor alias, communication channel details, OFAC screening results
  • [ ] Establish communication protocol: negotiator speaks for the organization — no direct IT/security contact with threat actor
  • [ ] Set internal decision checkpoints: 12h, 24h, 48h, 72h

2.2 Negotiation Principles

Principle Rationale
Never reveal you have cyber insurance Threat actors increase demands for insured organizations
Claim financial hardship Establishes baseline for reduced payment
Request proof of decryption capability Demand decryption of 2-3 non-critical test files before any payment
Request proof of data deletion For double extortion — demand evidence (knowing it is unreliable)
Extend deadlines Deadlines are artificial — most threat actors will extend repeatedly
Never make the first offer Let the threat actor establish the floor, then counter significantly lower
Maintain professional tone Antagonizing the threat actor does not help; keep it transactional
Document everything Every communication is potential evidence for law enforcement and insurance

2.3 Communication Templates (Synthetic Examples)

These are synthetic templates for training purposes. Actual communications should be drafted by your external negotiation firm.

Initial Response Template:

Subject: RE: Incident Reference [CASE-2026-XXXX]

We have received your communication. Our organization is a small/mid-size
operation and we are assessing our situation. We need additional time to
evaluate the scope of impact and discuss with our leadership.

We are willing to engage in good-faith discussion but need to understand:
1. What specific data do you claim to have obtained?
2. Can you provide proof of decryption capability for 2-3 test files?
3. What is your timeline flexibility?

We will respond within 48 hours.

Counter-Offer Template:

Subject: RE: Incident Reference [CASE-2026-XXXX]

Thank you for decrypting the test files. We have verified they are functional.

After consultation with our leadership, we must be transparent: the demanded
amount of [AMOUNT] far exceeds our financial capacity. We are a [SIZE]
organization with limited reserves.

We can offer [COUNTER — typically 10-20% of initial demand] as a good-faith
resolution. This represents a significant financial commitment for our
organization.

We are open to further discussion.

2.4 Parallel Recovery Assessment

While negotiation proceeds, aggressively pursue recovery alternatives:

  • [ ] Attempt decryption with publicly available decryptors (nomoreransom.org)
  • [ ] Assess partial backup recovery — which systems can be restored?
  • [ ] Evaluate bare-metal rebuild timeline for systems without backups
  • [ ] Identify manual workarounds for critical business processes
  • [ ] Quantify business impact per day of downtime (for pay/don't-pay ROI)
Recovery Option Systems Covered Estimated Time Data Loss Confidence
Full backup restore _____ ___ RPO: ______ High / Med / Low
Partial backup + rebuild _____ ___ RPO: ______ High / Med / Low
Public decryptor available _____ ___ None High / Med / Low
Full rebuild (no backup) _____ ___ Complete High
Pay ransom + decrypt All encrypted ___ Minimal Medium

Phase 3 — Pay/Don't-Pay Decision Gate (24–72 Hours)

This is an executive-level business decision, not a technical decision. The IR team provides data — leadership decides.

3.1 Decision Framework

Decision Factor Pay Don't Pay
OFAC screening CLEAR — no sanctions match MATCH — payment is illegal
Backup availability No viable backups for critical systems Clean, tested backups available
Exfiltrated data Regulated data confirmed exfiltrated No exfiltration or non-sensitive data only
Business impact Existential risk — >$X/day revenue loss Manageable disruption, workarounds exist
Decryptor reliability Test decryption successful Threat actor unresponsive or decryptor failed
Insurance coverage Policy covers ransom payments Policy excludes or organization is uninsured
Law enforcement guidance No objection (case-specific) Strong objection — active investigation
Regulatory posture No regulatory prohibition in jurisdiction Jurisdiction prohibits ransom payments

3.2 Executive Briefing Template

RANSOMWARE INCIDENT — EXECUTIVE DECISION BRIEF
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL — Attorney-Client Privileged

Incident ID:       [IR-2026-XXXX]
Date:              [YYYY-MM-DD]
Briefing Prepared: [Name], [Title]

SITUATION SUMMARY:
- [X] systems encrypted across [Y] business units
- Threat actor: [Alias] — [known/unknown] group
- Demand: [Amount] in [Currency]
- Current negotiated position: [Negotiated amount]
- Data exfiltration: [Confirmed/Claimed/None]
- OFAC screening: [Clear/Pending]

RECOVERY OPTIONS:
1. Pay ransom (negotiated): $[Amount] — estimated [X] days to decrypt
2. Backup recovery: [X]% of systems recoverable — estimated [Y] days
3. Full rebuild: estimated [Z] days — [Data loss description]

BUSINESS IMPACT:
- Revenue loss: $[Amount]/day
- Cumulative impact to date: $[Amount]
- Regulatory notification obligations: [Yes/No — detail]
- Customer/partner impact: [Description]

RECOMMENDATION: [Pay / Don't Pay / Hybrid — with rationale]

DECISION REQUIRED BY: [Date/Time]

3.3 Decision Documentation

  • [ ] Executive decision recorded in writing with signatures
  • [ ] Legal counsel opinion documented (attorney-client privilege)
  • [ ] Insurance carrier notified of decision and consulted on coverage
  • [ ] OFAC compliance documentation retained regardless of decision
  • [ ] Board notification (if material event per governance policy)

Phase 4 — Payment Execution (If Authorized) (48–96 Hours)

This phase executes ONLY if the executive team authorizes payment after OFAC clearance and legal review.

4.1 Cryptocurrency Procurement

  • [ ] Engage approved cryptocurrency broker (pre-contracted or insurance panel)
  • [ ] Verify wallet address provided by threat actor (cross-check with negotiator)
  • [ ] Procure exact amount in specified cryptocurrency
  • [ ] Document: wallet addresses, transaction hashes, exchange confirmations, timestamps
  • [ ] Retain blockchain records for law enforcement, insurance, and tax purposes
Transaction Detail Value
Cryptocurrency type BTC / XMR
Amount (crypto) _____
Amount (USD equivalent) _____
Source wallet _____
Destination wallet _____
Transaction hash _____
Timestamp (UTC) _____
Exchange/broker used _____
Authorization reference _____

4.2 Decryptor Validation

NEVER run the decryptor on production systems first. Always test in isolation.

  • [ ] Obtain decryptor from threat actor after payment confirmation
  • [ ] Hash the decryptor binary and submit to sandbox analysis (malware check)
  • [ ] Test decryptor on an isolated VM with copies of 5-10 encrypted files of varying types
  • [ ] Verify: file integrity after decryption, no additional malware dropped, no new C2 connections
  • [ ] Document decryption success rate and any file types that fail
# Validate decrypted file integrity (Windows)
# Compare decrypted files against known-good hashes where available
$testFiles = Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\DecryptionTest\Decrypted" -Recurse -File
foreach ($file in $testFiles) {
    $hash = Get-FileHash -Path $file.FullName -Algorithm SHA256
    Write-Output "$($hash.Hash)  $($file.Name)  Size:$($file.Length)"
}

# Monitor for suspicious network activity during decryption
Get-NetTCPConnection | Where-Object {
    $_.State -eq "Established" -and
    $_.RemoteAddress -notmatch "^(10\.|192\.168\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\.)"
} | Select-Object LocalAddress, LocalPort, RemoteAddress, RemotePort, OwningProcess |
    Format-Table -AutoSize

4.3 Staged Decryption

  • [ ] Prioritize decryption order: domain controllers → authentication systems → databases → file servers → endpoints
  • [ ] Decrypt one system per tier first — validate before proceeding to batch
  • [ ] Monitor each decrypted system for 30 minutes before decrypting the next
  • [ ] Maintain network isolation during decryption — do not reconnect to production until verified clean
  • [ ] Run full EDR scan on each decrypted system before reconnecting

Phase 5 — Recovery & Restoration (72–120 Hours)

5.1 System Restoration Sequence

Priority System Category Restore Method Validation
1 Active Directory / DNS / DHCP Clean rebuild preferred over decryption Verify no persistence, new KRBTGT keys
2 Authentication (MFA, RADIUS) Rebuild from backup or config export Test authentication flows end-to-end
3 Core databases Backup restore preferred; decrypt if needed Data integrity checks, application testing
4 Business-critical applications Backup or rebuild with clean install media Functional testing, user acceptance
5 File servers Decrypt or restore from backup Spot-check file integrity across shares
6 Email systems Backup restore preferred Mail flow testing, calendar validation
7 User endpoints Reimage preferred over decryption EDR agent verified, domain rejoin

5.2 Active Directory Recovery

If domain controllers were encrypted, assume the AD is compromised. Rebuild — do not simply decrypt.

  • [ ] Reset KRBTGT password twice (with 12-hour interval between resets)
  • [ ] Reset all privileged account passwords (Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Schema Admins)
  • [ ] Review and remove any unauthorized Group Policy Objects
  • [ ] Check for new trust relationships or SID history manipulation
  • [ ] Verify AdminSDHolder and dsHeuristics are not modified
  • [ ] Scan for Golden Ticket / Silver Ticket persistence indicators

5.3 Credential Reset Plan

Account Type Reset Method Priority Verification
KRBTGT Twice, 12h apart P0 Golden Ticket invalidation confirmed
Domain Admins Manual reset, unique per account P0 Login test from clean system
Service accounts Rotate and update dependent services P1 Service functionality verified
All user accounts Force password reset at next logon P1 Monitor for lockouts
Local administrator LAPS rotation or manual unique passwords P2 Verify LAPS is functioning
Application accounts Rotate and update connection strings P2 Application health checks

5.4 Network Hardening (Post-Recovery)

  • [ ] Block all threat actor C2 infrastructure at perimeter firewall permanently
  • [ ] Re-evaluate RDP exposure — disable or restrict to VPN-only access
  • [ ] Deploy network segmentation between high-value assets and general network
  • [ ] Enable enhanced logging on all recovered systems (PowerShell ScriptBlock, WinRM, Sysmon)
  • [ ] Verify EDR coverage on 100% of endpoints before reconnecting to network

Phase 6 — Lessons Learned & Regulatory (Within 2 Weeks)

6.1 Metrics to Capture

Metric Definition Target
Time to Detect (TTD) Initial compromise → detection < 24 hours
Time to Contain (TTC) Detection → encryption halted < 4 hours
Time to Recover (TTR) Containment → business operations restored < 120 hours
Dwell Time Initial access → ransomware deployment Identify precisely
Ransom Demanded vs. Paid Negotiation effectiveness > 50% reduction if paid
Data Recovery Rate Percentage of data recovered (backup + decrypt) > 95%
Systems Rebuilt vs. Decrypted Preference for rebuild over decryption Track ratio
Total Financial Impact Ransom + downtime + recovery + regulatory + legal Document fully

6.2 Regulatory Notification Tracker

Regulation Threshold Deadline Notified Date Reference
GDPR (EU) Personal data breach 72 hours Yes / No / N/A __ Art. 33
HIPAA (USA) PHI breach > 500 individuals 60 days Yes / No / N/A __ 45 CFR 164.408
PCI DSS Cardholder data compromise Immediately Yes / No / N/A __ Req. 12.10
SEC (USA) Material cybersecurity incident 4 business days (8-K) Yes / No / N/A __ Item 1.05
State breach laws PII of state residents Varies by state Yes / No / N/A __ Per state statute
CIRCIA (USA) Critical infrastructure entity 72h (incident) / 24h (payment) Yes / No / N/A __ CISA CIRCIA
Sector regulator Industry-specific Varies Yes / No / N/A __ __

6.3 Insurance Claim Documentation

  • [ ] Complete incident timeline with UTC timestamps
  • [ ] All ransom communications preserved (screenshots, chat logs)
  • [ ] OFAC screening documentation
  • [ ] Executive decision memo (pay/don't-pay)
  • [ ] Payment records (transaction hashes, broker receipts)
  • [ ] Business interruption loss calculations
  • [ ] Third-party vendor invoices (negotiation firm, forensics, legal)
  • [ ] Regulatory notification copies
  • [ ] System restoration costs and labor hours

6.4 Post-Incident Review Agenda

  • [ ] Complete attack timeline: initial access → lateral movement → exfiltration → encryption
  • [ ] Entry vector identification and remediation confirmation
  • [ ] Backup strategy assessment: why were backups insufficient?
  • [ ] Detection gap analysis: why wasn't the attacker detected earlier?
  • [ ] Negotiation effectiveness review (if applicable)
  • [ ] Recovery process evaluation: what slowed restoration?
  • [ ] Communication review: were stakeholders informed appropriately?
  • [ ] Control improvements identified, assigned, and deadlined

ATT&CK Technique Mapping

Technique ID Technique Name Playbook Relevance
T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact Primary ransomware encryption activity
T1490 Inhibit System Recovery Shadow copy deletion, backup destruction
T1489 Service Stop Stopping backup agents, databases, security software
T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Double extortion data theft
T1567 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage Data staging to cloud for exfiltration
T1021 Remote Services Lateral movement via RDP, SMB, WinRM
T1078 Valid Accounts Credential-based access for deployment
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Ransomware deployment scripts
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information Packed/encrypted ransomware payloads
T1562 Impair Defenses Disabling EDR, tamper protection bypass

Communication Templates

Internal Stakeholder Update

RANSOMWARE INCIDENT UPDATE — [Date] [Time] UTC
Status: [Active Response / Negotiation / Recovery / Resolved]
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL

CURRENT STATUS:
- Encrypted systems: [X] of [Y] total
- Business operations: [Fully impacted / Partially impacted / Workarounds active]
- Recovery progress: [X]% of critical systems restored
- Negotiation status: [Engaged / Stalled / Resolved / Not pursuing]

ACTIONS SINCE LAST UPDATE:
- [Action 1]
- [Action 2]

NEXT STEPS:
- [Next action 1 — ETA]
- [Next action 2 — ETA]

NEXT UPDATE: [Date/Time]
Incident Commander: [Name]
Bridge: [Link/Number]

Customer/Partner Notification (Post Legal Review)

Subject: Security Incident Notification — [Organization Name]

Dear [Customer/Partner],

We are writing to inform you of a cybersecurity incident that [may have /
has] affected [description of impact].

WHAT HAPPENED:
On [date], we detected unauthorized activity in our systems. We immediately
activated our incident response procedures and engaged external
cybersecurity experts.

WHAT INFORMATION WAS INVOLVED:
[Description — be specific per legal/regulatory guidance]

WHAT WE ARE DOING:
- We have contained the incident and are restoring systems
- We have engaged law enforcement and are cooperating fully
- We have engaged third-party forensic investigators
- [Additional remediation steps]

WHAT YOU CAN DO:
- [Specific protective actions relevant to the data involved]
- [Contact information for questions]

We take the security of your information seriously and sincerely apologize
for any concern this may cause.

[Name], [Title]
[Organization]
[Incident hotline number]

Runbook Checklist

Demand Assessment

  • [ ] IR-PB-001 containment confirmed complete
  • [ ] Ransom demand documented (amount, currency, deadline, contact method)
  • [ ] Threat actor intelligence gathered and cross-referenced
  • [ ] OFAC/sanctions screening completed and documented
  • [ ] Law enforcement notified (FBI IC3, CISA, local field office)
  • [ ] Cyber insurance carrier notified

Negotiation

  • [ ] External negotiation firm engaged (if proceeding)
  • [ ] Communication protocol established (single point of contact)
  • [ ] Parallel recovery options assessed and documented
  • [ ] Proof of decryption capability requested and validated
  • [ ] Decision checkpoints scheduled (12h, 24h, 48h, 72h)

Pay/Don't-Pay Decision

  • [ ] Decision framework completed with all stakeholder input
  • [ ] Executive briefing delivered
  • [ ] Executive decision documented in writing
  • [ ] Legal opinion documented (attorney-client privilege)
  • [ ] Insurance coverage confirmed (if paying)
  • [ ] Board notified (if material event)

Payment Execution (If Authorized)

  • [ ] Cryptocurrency broker engaged
  • [ ] Wallet address verified
  • [ ] Payment executed and transaction documented
  • [ ] Decryptor received and sandboxed for analysis
  • [ ] Decryptor tested on isolated system — success confirmed
  • [ ] Staged decryption plan executed

Recovery

  • [ ] Systems restored in priority order
  • [ ] Active Directory rebuilt or verified clean
  • [ ] KRBTGT reset twice with 12h interval
  • [ ] All privileged credentials rotated
  • [ ] EDR verified on 100% of endpoints
  • [ ] Network hardening measures deployed

Lessons Learned

  • [ ] Complete attack timeline documented
  • [ ] Regulatory notifications sent per tracker
  • [ ] Insurance claim documentation assembled
  • [ ] Post-incident review conducted within 2 weeks
  • [ ] Backup strategy improvements implemented
  • [ ] Detection and prevention gaps addressed
  • [ ] Playbook updated with findings

Nexus SecOps Cross-References

Topic Resource
Ransomware deep dive Chapter 23 — Ransomware Deep Dive
Incident response lifecycle Chapter 9 — Incident Response Lifecycle
Advanced incident response Chapter 28 — Advanced Incident Response
Digital forensics Chapter 27 — Digital Forensics
Threat intelligence Chapter 7 — Threat Intelligence Context
Threat actor encyclopedia Chapter 22 — Threat Actor Encyclopedia
Security governance & privacy Chapter 13 — Security Governance, Privacy & Risk
Initial ransomware response IR-PB-001 — Ransomware Incident Playbook
Data breach response IR-PB-006 — Data Breach Playbook

Nexus SecOps Benchmark Control Mapping

Control ID Control Name Playbook Phase
Nexus SecOps-RN-01 Ransomware Negotiation Governance Phase 1 — Demand Assessment
Nexus SecOps-RN-02 OFAC/Sanctions Compliance Screening Phase 1 — Demand Assessment
Nexus SecOps-RN-03 External Negotiation Engagement Phase 2 — Negotiation Strategy
Nexus SecOps-RN-04 Executive Pay/Don't-Pay Decision Framework Phase 3 — Decision Gate
Nexus SecOps-RN-05 Cryptocurrency Payment Controls Phase 4 — Payment Execution
Nexus SecOps-RN-06 Post-Ransom Recovery & Regulatory Compliance Phase 6 — Lessons Learned