Ransomware Negotiation & Recovery Playbook¶
CRITICAL — Executive-Level Decision Required
This playbook supplements IR-PB-001 (Ransomware Incident Playbook). It activates when containment is complete and the organization faces a pay/don't-pay decision. Negotiation is a stalling tactic to buy recovery time — not an endorsement of payment. Never pay without legal counsel, executive authorization, and OFAC sanctions screening.
Metadata¶
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Playbook ID | IR-PB-007 |
| Severity | Critical (P1) |
| RTO — Containment | < 4 hours (see IR-PB-001) |
| RTO — Recovery | < 120 hours (5 days) |
| Owner | IR Lead + General Counsel (joint) |
| Escalation | IR Lead → CISO → General Counsel → CEO → Board (if material) |
| Prerequisite | IR-PB-001 containment phase must be complete before activating this playbook |
| Last Reviewed | 2026-03-22 |
Severity Classification Matrix¶
| Factor | Low (P3) | Medium (P2) | High (P1) | Critical (P0) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Systems Encrypted | < 10 endpoints, non-critical | 10-50 endpoints, limited business impact | 50-500 endpoints, business-critical systems | Domain controllers, backup infrastructure, >500 endpoints |
| Data Exfiltration | No evidence of exfiltration | Exfiltration claimed, unverified | Exfiltration confirmed, internal data | Exfiltration confirmed, regulated data (PII/PHI/PCI) |
| Backup Availability | Clean backups available, tested | Backups available, untested | Partial backups, integrity uncertain | Backups encrypted or destroyed |
| Business Impact | Minor operational disruption | Moderate disruption, workarounds available | Significant disruption, revenue impact | Complete operational halt, existential risk |
| Regulatory Exposure | No notification required | Internal reporting only | Sector regulator notification required | Multi-jurisdiction mandatory notification + litigation risk |
RACI — Roles & Responsibilities¶
| Activity | IR Lead | CISO | Legal | CEO/Exec | Finance | External Negotiator | Forensics | Comms/PR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Activate negotiation playbook | R | A | C | I | I | — | I | I |
| Engage external negotiation firm | C | A | R | A | C | — | — | — |
| OFAC/sanctions screening | I | C | A | I | R | C | — | — |
| Negotiation communications | I | C | C | I | — | R | C | — |
| Pay/don't-pay decision | C | C | C | A | R | C | C | — |
| Cryptocurrency procurement | — | I | C | A | R | C | — | — |
| Decryptor testing & validation | R | I | — | I | — | C | R | — |
| Recovery execution | A | I | — | I | — | — | R | — |
| External communications | I | C | A | A | — | — | — | R |
| Post-incident legal review | C | C | A | I | C | I | R | I |
R = Responsible, A = Accountable, C = Consulted, I = Informed
Trigger Conditions¶
Activate this playbook when ALL of the following are true:
- [ ] IR-PB-001 containment phase is complete (active encryption halted)
- [ ] Ransom demand has been received (note, dark web portal, email, or phone)
- [ ] Scope of encrypted systems and data exfiltration has been assessed
- [ ] Backup availability and integrity have been evaluated
AND any of the following:
- [ ] Clean backups are unavailable, incomplete, or untested for critical systems
- [ ] Threat actor claims data exfiltration with evidence (file listings, sample data)
- [ ] Business continuity is at risk without decryption capability
- [ ] Regulatory exposure from exfiltrated data requires threat actor engagement to assess scope
Decision Tree¶
flowchart TD
A([Ransomware Containment Complete\nDemand Received]) --> B{Are verified clean\nbackups available for\nALL critical systems?}
B -- Yes --> C[Begin parallel recovery\nfrom backups — DO NOT\nengage threat actor yet]
B -- No/Partial --> D{Is there evidence\nof data exfiltration?}
B -- Unknown --> E[Assess backup integrity\nwithin 4 hours]
E --> B
C --> F{Recovery feasible\nwithin RTO?}
F -- Yes --> G[Full backup recovery\nNo negotiation needed]
F -- No --> D
D -- "Yes — confirmed" --> H{Does exfiltrated data\ncontain regulated\ninformation?}
D -- "Claimed only" --> I[Engage negotiator to\nverify exfiltration claims\nBuy time for recovery]
D -- No --> J{Can the organization\ntolerate data loss\nfrom unrecoverable systems?}
H -- Yes --> K[MANDATORY: Engage\nlegal + external negotiator\nOFAC screening required]
H -- No --> I
I --> L{OFAC/sanctions\nscreening clear?}
K --> L
J -- Yes --> G
J -- No --> I
L -- Clear --> M{Executive pay/don't-pay\ndecision gate}
L -- "Sanctioned Entity" --> N[DO NOT PAY\nEngage law enforcement\nPursue recovery alternatives]
M -- Pay --> O[Procure cryptocurrency\nExecute payment\nObtain decryptor]
M -- "Don't Pay" --> P[Accept data loss\nFull rebuild from\nclean state]
O --> Q[Test decryptor on\nisolated system first]
Q --> R{Decryptor works?}
R -- Yes --> S[Staged decryption\nwith integrity checks]
R -- No --> T[Re-engage negotiator\nDemand working decryptor]
T --> Q
S --> U([Recovery Complete\nLessons Learned])
G --> U
P --> U
N --> U Phase 1 — Demand Assessment & Intelligence (0–4 Hours)¶
All threat actor names, wallet addresses, and communication examples below are 100% synthetic. Never use real threat actor identifiers.
1.1 Ransom Demand Documentation¶
Immediately document the ransom demand with full detail:
- [ ] Photograph/screenshot the ransom note (do not interact with embedded links yet)
- [ ] Record: demanded amount, currency, payment deadline, contact method
- [ ] Identify threat actor group (if named) — cross-reference with threat intelligence
- [ ] Document the communication channel (Tor site, email, chat portal)
- [ ] Preserve all artifacts for law enforcement
| Demand Element | Details | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Threat actor alias | _____ | Synthetic example: "DarkVault Collective" |
| Demanded amount | _____ | Note: initial demand is almost always negotiable |
| Currency | BTC / XMR / Other | Monero demands complicate tracing |
| Payment deadline | _____ | Deadlines are psychological pressure — usually flexible |
| Contact method | Tor portal / email / chat | Document the exact URL/address |
| Double extortion? | Yes / No | Data leak threat in addition to encryption |
| Triple extortion? | Yes / No | DDoS or customer/partner notification threats |
| Proof of exfiltration | File listing / sample data | Verify authenticity — could be fabricated |
1.2 Threat Actor Intelligence¶
// Correlate threat actor IOCs from ransom note with historical telemetry
let RansomIOCs = datatable(indicator:string, type:string) [
"203.0.113.45", "IP",
"c2-beacon.synth-ransom.example.com", "Domain",
"a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2", "SHA256"
];
// Check network connections to known C2
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| join kind=inner (RansomIOCs | where type == "IP") on $left.RemoteIP == $right.indicator
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp asc
// Identify initial access timeline
DeviceLogonEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where LogonType in ("RemoteInteractive", "Network")
| where RemoteIP !startswith "10." and RemoteIP !startswith "192.168."
| summarize FirstSeen=min(Timestamp), LastSeen=max(Timestamp), LogonCount=count()
by RemoteIP, AccountName, DeviceName
| order by FirstSeen asc
// Correlate threat actor IOCs with historical network data
index=firewall sourcetype=pan:traffic
| where dest_ip IN ("203.0.113.45", "198.51.100.22")
OR query IN ("c2-beacon.synth-ransom.example.com")
| stats earliest(_time) AS first_seen, latest(_time) AS last_seen, count BY src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port
| sort first_seen
// Identify initial access — unusual RDP/VPN logins in 30-day window
index=auth sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=10
| where NOT cidrmatch("10.0.0.0/8", Source_Network_Address)
AND NOT cidrmatch("192.168.0.0/16", Source_Network_Address)
| stats earliest(_time) AS first_logon, count BY Source_Network_Address, Account_Name, ComputerName
| sort first_logon
1.3 OFAC Sanctions Screening¶
Paying a sanctioned entity is a federal crime (USA) and can trigger enforcement actions. Screen BEFORE any payment decision.
- [ ] Cross-reference threat actor alias with OFAC SDN list
- [ ] Cross-reference any known wallet addresses with blockchain analysis providers
- [ ] Check FBI/CISA advisories for attribution to sanctioned nation-state groups
- [ ] Document screening results — retain for compliance records regardless of pay/don't-pay decision
- [ ] If sanctioned: STOP — do not pay under any circumstances — engage legal and law enforcement
| Screening Check | Source | Result | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| OFAC SDN List | treasury.gov/ofac | Clear / Match | __ |
| Blockchain analysis | Chainalysis / Elliptic | Clear / Match | __ |
| FBI Flash Alert | ic3.gov | No advisory / Advisory exists | __ |
| CISA Advisory | cisa.gov/stopransomware | No advisory / Advisory exists | __ |
| EU Sanctions List | sanctionsmap.eu | Clear / Match | __ |
1.4 Law Enforcement Notification¶
- [ ] Report to FBI IC3: https://ic3.gov (USA) or relevant national CERT
- [ ] Report to CISA: https://cisa.gov/report
- [ ] Contact local FBI field office if double extortion involves regulated data
- [ ] Notify cyber insurance carrier — most policies require prompt notification
- [ ] Document all law enforcement case numbers and points of contact
Phase 2 — Negotiation Strategy (4–24 Hours)¶
Negotiation is primarily a time-buying tactic to enable parallel recovery efforts. Even if you intend to pay, negotiation typically reduces the demand by 40-60%.
2.1 Engage External Negotiation Firm¶
- [ ] Contact ransomware negotiation firm (pre-contracted or via insurance panel)
- [ ] Provide: ransom note, threat actor alias, communication channel details, OFAC screening results
- [ ] Establish communication protocol: negotiator speaks for the organization — no direct IT/security contact with threat actor
- [ ] Set internal decision checkpoints: 12h, 24h, 48h, 72h
2.2 Negotiation Principles¶
| Principle | Rationale |
|---|---|
| Never reveal you have cyber insurance | Threat actors increase demands for insured organizations |
| Claim financial hardship | Establishes baseline for reduced payment |
| Request proof of decryption capability | Demand decryption of 2-3 non-critical test files before any payment |
| Request proof of data deletion | For double extortion — demand evidence (knowing it is unreliable) |
| Extend deadlines | Deadlines are artificial — most threat actors will extend repeatedly |
| Never make the first offer | Let the threat actor establish the floor, then counter significantly lower |
| Maintain professional tone | Antagonizing the threat actor does not help; keep it transactional |
| Document everything | Every communication is potential evidence for law enforcement and insurance |
2.3 Communication Templates (Synthetic Examples)¶
These are synthetic templates for training purposes. Actual communications should be drafted by your external negotiation firm.
Initial Response Template:
Subject: RE: Incident Reference [CASE-2026-XXXX]
We have received your communication. Our organization is a small/mid-size
operation and we are assessing our situation. We need additional time to
evaluate the scope of impact and discuss with our leadership.
We are willing to engage in good-faith discussion but need to understand:
1. What specific data do you claim to have obtained?
2. Can you provide proof of decryption capability for 2-3 test files?
3. What is your timeline flexibility?
We will respond within 48 hours.
Counter-Offer Template:
Subject: RE: Incident Reference [CASE-2026-XXXX]
Thank you for decrypting the test files. We have verified they are functional.
After consultation with our leadership, we must be transparent: the demanded
amount of [AMOUNT] far exceeds our financial capacity. We are a [SIZE]
organization with limited reserves.
We can offer [COUNTER — typically 10-20% of initial demand] as a good-faith
resolution. This represents a significant financial commitment for our
organization.
We are open to further discussion.
2.4 Parallel Recovery Assessment¶
While negotiation proceeds, aggressively pursue recovery alternatives:
- [ ] Attempt decryption with publicly available decryptors (nomoreransom.org)
- [ ] Assess partial backup recovery — which systems can be restored?
- [ ] Evaluate bare-metal rebuild timeline for systems without backups
- [ ] Identify manual workarounds for critical business processes
- [ ] Quantify business impact per day of downtime (for pay/don't-pay ROI)
| Recovery Option | Systems Covered | Estimated Time | Data Loss | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Full backup restore | _____ | ___ | RPO: ______ | High / Med / Low |
| Partial backup + rebuild | _____ | ___ | RPO: ______ | High / Med / Low |
| Public decryptor available | _____ | ___ | None | High / Med / Low |
| Full rebuild (no backup) | _____ | ___ | Complete | High |
| Pay ransom + decrypt | All encrypted | ___ | Minimal | Medium |
Phase 3 — Pay/Don't-Pay Decision Gate (24–72 Hours)¶
This is an executive-level business decision, not a technical decision. The IR team provides data — leadership decides.
3.1 Decision Framework¶
| Decision Factor | Pay | Don't Pay |
|---|---|---|
| OFAC screening | CLEAR — no sanctions match | MATCH — payment is illegal |
| Backup availability | No viable backups for critical systems | Clean, tested backups available |
| Exfiltrated data | Regulated data confirmed exfiltrated | No exfiltration or non-sensitive data only |
| Business impact | Existential risk — >$X/day revenue loss | Manageable disruption, workarounds exist |
| Decryptor reliability | Test decryption successful | Threat actor unresponsive or decryptor failed |
| Insurance coverage | Policy covers ransom payments | Policy excludes or organization is uninsured |
| Law enforcement guidance | No objection (case-specific) | Strong objection — active investigation |
| Regulatory posture | No regulatory prohibition in jurisdiction | Jurisdiction prohibits ransom payments |
3.2 Executive Briefing Template¶
RANSOMWARE INCIDENT — EXECUTIVE DECISION BRIEF
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL — Attorney-Client Privileged
Incident ID: [IR-2026-XXXX]
Date: [YYYY-MM-DD]
Briefing Prepared: [Name], [Title]
SITUATION SUMMARY:
- [X] systems encrypted across [Y] business units
- Threat actor: [Alias] — [known/unknown] group
- Demand: [Amount] in [Currency]
- Current negotiated position: [Negotiated amount]
- Data exfiltration: [Confirmed/Claimed/None]
- OFAC screening: [Clear/Pending]
RECOVERY OPTIONS:
1. Pay ransom (negotiated): $[Amount] — estimated [X] days to decrypt
2. Backup recovery: [X]% of systems recoverable — estimated [Y] days
3. Full rebuild: estimated [Z] days — [Data loss description]
BUSINESS IMPACT:
- Revenue loss: $[Amount]/day
- Cumulative impact to date: $[Amount]
- Regulatory notification obligations: [Yes/No — detail]
- Customer/partner impact: [Description]
RECOMMENDATION: [Pay / Don't Pay / Hybrid — with rationale]
DECISION REQUIRED BY: [Date/Time]
3.3 Decision Documentation¶
- [ ] Executive decision recorded in writing with signatures
- [ ] Legal counsel opinion documented (attorney-client privilege)
- [ ] Insurance carrier notified of decision and consulted on coverage
- [ ] OFAC compliance documentation retained regardless of decision
- [ ] Board notification (if material event per governance policy)
Phase 4 — Payment Execution (If Authorized) (48–96 Hours)¶
This phase executes ONLY if the executive team authorizes payment after OFAC clearance and legal review.
4.1 Cryptocurrency Procurement¶
- [ ] Engage approved cryptocurrency broker (pre-contracted or insurance panel)
- [ ] Verify wallet address provided by threat actor (cross-check with negotiator)
- [ ] Procure exact amount in specified cryptocurrency
- [ ] Document: wallet addresses, transaction hashes, exchange confirmations, timestamps
- [ ] Retain blockchain records for law enforcement, insurance, and tax purposes
| Transaction Detail | Value |
|---|---|
| Cryptocurrency type | BTC / XMR |
| Amount (crypto) | _____ |
| Amount (USD equivalent) | _____ |
| Source wallet | _____ |
| Destination wallet | _____ |
| Transaction hash | _____ |
| Timestamp (UTC) | _____ |
| Exchange/broker used | _____ |
| Authorization reference | _____ |
4.2 Decryptor Validation¶
NEVER run the decryptor on production systems first. Always test in isolation.
- [ ] Obtain decryptor from threat actor after payment confirmation
- [ ] Hash the decryptor binary and submit to sandbox analysis (malware check)
- [ ] Test decryptor on an isolated VM with copies of 5-10 encrypted files of varying types
- [ ] Verify: file integrity after decryption, no additional malware dropped, no new C2 connections
- [ ] Document decryption success rate and any file types that fail
# Validate decrypted file integrity (Windows)
# Compare decrypted files against known-good hashes where available
$testFiles = Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\DecryptionTest\Decrypted" -Recurse -File
foreach ($file in $testFiles) {
$hash = Get-FileHash -Path $file.FullName -Algorithm SHA256
Write-Output "$($hash.Hash) $($file.Name) Size:$($file.Length)"
}
# Monitor for suspicious network activity during decryption
Get-NetTCPConnection | Where-Object {
$_.State -eq "Established" -and
$_.RemoteAddress -notmatch "^(10\.|192\.168\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\.)"
} | Select-Object LocalAddress, LocalPort, RemoteAddress, RemotePort, OwningProcess |
Format-Table -AutoSize
4.3 Staged Decryption¶
- [ ] Prioritize decryption order: domain controllers → authentication systems → databases → file servers → endpoints
- [ ] Decrypt one system per tier first — validate before proceeding to batch
- [ ] Monitor each decrypted system for 30 minutes before decrypting the next
- [ ] Maintain network isolation during decryption — do not reconnect to production until verified clean
- [ ] Run full EDR scan on each decrypted system before reconnecting
Phase 5 — Recovery & Restoration (72–120 Hours)¶
5.1 System Restoration Sequence¶
| Priority | System Category | Restore Method | Validation |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Active Directory / DNS / DHCP | Clean rebuild preferred over decryption | Verify no persistence, new KRBTGT keys |
| 2 | Authentication (MFA, RADIUS) | Rebuild from backup or config export | Test authentication flows end-to-end |
| 3 | Core databases | Backup restore preferred; decrypt if needed | Data integrity checks, application testing |
| 4 | Business-critical applications | Backup or rebuild with clean install media | Functional testing, user acceptance |
| 5 | File servers | Decrypt or restore from backup | Spot-check file integrity across shares |
| 6 | Email systems | Backup restore preferred | Mail flow testing, calendar validation |
| 7 | User endpoints | Reimage preferred over decryption | EDR agent verified, domain rejoin |
5.2 Active Directory Recovery¶
If domain controllers were encrypted, assume the AD is compromised. Rebuild — do not simply decrypt.
- [ ] Reset KRBTGT password twice (with 12-hour interval between resets)
- [ ] Reset all privileged account passwords (Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Schema Admins)
- [ ] Review and remove any unauthorized Group Policy Objects
- [ ] Check for new trust relationships or SID history manipulation
- [ ] Verify AdminSDHolder and dsHeuristics are not modified
- [ ] Scan for Golden Ticket / Silver Ticket persistence indicators
5.3 Credential Reset Plan¶
| Account Type | Reset Method | Priority | Verification |
|---|---|---|---|
| KRBTGT | Twice, 12h apart | P0 | Golden Ticket invalidation confirmed |
| Domain Admins | Manual reset, unique per account | P0 | Login test from clean system |
| Service accounts | Rotate and update dependent services | P1 | Service functionality verified |
| All user accounts | Force password reset at next logon | P1 | Monitor for lockouts |
| Local administrator | LAPS rotation or manual unique passwords | P2 | Verify LAPS is functioning |
| Application accounts | Rotate and update connection strings | P2 | Application health checks |
5.4 Network Hardening (Post-Recovery)¶
- [ ] Block all threat actor C2 infrastructure at perimeter firewall permanently
- [ ] Re-evaluate RDP exposure — disable or restrict to VPN-only access
- [ ] Deploy network segmentation between high-value assets and general network
- [ ] Enable enhanced logging on all recovered systems (PowerShell ScriptBlock, WinRM, Sysmon)
- [ ] Verify EDR coverage on 100% of endpoints before reconnecting to network
Phase 6 — Lessons Learned & Regulatory (Within 2 Weeks)¶
6.1 Metrics to Capture¶
| Metric | Definition | Target |
|---|---|---|
| Time to Detect (TTD) | Initial compromise → detection | < 24 hours |
| Time to Contain (TTC) | Detection → encryption halted | < 4 hours |
| Time to Recover (TTR) | Containment → business operations restored | < 120 hours |
| Dwell Time | Initial access → ransomware deployment | Identify precisely |
| Ransom Demanded vs. Paid | Negotiation effectiveness | > 50% reduction if paid |
| Data Recovery Rate | Percentage of data recovered (backup + decrypt) | > 95% |
| Systems Rebuilt vs. Decrypted | Preference for rebuild over decryption | Track ratio |
| Total Financial Impact | Ransom + downtime + recovery + regulatory + legal | Document fully |
6.2 Regulatory Notification Tracker¶
| Regulation | Threshold | Deadline | Notified | Date | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GDPR (EU) | Personal data breach | 72 hours | Yes / No / N/A | __ | Art. 33 |
| HIPAA (USA) | PHI breach > 500 individuals | 60 days | Yes / No / N/A | __ | 45 CFR 164.408 |
| PCI DSS | Cardholder data compromise | Immediately | Yes / No / N/A | __ | Req. 12.10 |
| SEC (USA) | Material cybersecurity incident | 4 business days (8-K) | Yes / No / N/A | __ | Item 1.05 |
| State breach laws | PII of state residents | Varies by state | Yes / No / N/A | __ | Per state statute |
| CIRCIA (USA) | Critical infrastructure entity | 72h (incident) / 24h (payment) | Yes / No / N/A | __ | CISA CIRCIA |
| Sector regulator | Industry-specific | Varies | Yes / No / N/A | __ | __ |
6.3 Insurance Claim Documentation¶
- [ ] Complete incident timeline with UTC timestamps
- [ ] All ransom communications preserved (screenshots, chat logs)
- [ ] OFAC screening documentation
- [ ] Executive decision memo (pay/don't-pay)
- [ ] Payment records (transaction hashes, broker receipts)
- [ ] Business interruption loss calculations
- [ ] Third-party vendor invoices (negotiation firm, forensics, legal)
- [ ] Regulatory notification copies
- [ ] System restoration costs and labor hours
6.4 Post-Incident Review Agenda¶
- [ ] Complete attack timeline: initial access → lateral movement → exfiltration → encryption
- [ ] Entry vector identification and remediation confirmation
- [ ] Backup strategy assessment: why were backups insufficient?
- [ ] Detection gap analysis: why wasn't the attacker detected earlier?
- [ ] Negotiation effectiveness review (if applicable)
- [ ] Recovery process evaluation: what slowed restoration?
- [ ] Communication review: were stakeholders informed appropriately?
- [ ] Control improvements identified, assigned, and deadlined
ATT&CK Technique Mapping¶
| Technique ID | Technique Name | Playbook Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact | Primary ransomware encryption activity |
| T1490 | Inhibit System Recovery | Shadow copy deletion, backup destruction |
| T1489 | Service Stop | Stopping backup agents, databases, security software |
| T1048 | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | Double extortion data theft |
| T1567 | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage | Data staging to cloud for exfiltration |
| T1021 | Remote Services | Lateral movement via RDP, SMB, WinRM |
| T1078 | Valid Accounts | Credential-based access for deployment |
| T1059 | Command and Scripting Interpreter | Ransomware deployment scripts |
| T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | Packed/encrypted ransomware payloads |
| T1562 | Impair Defenses | Disabling EDR, tamper protection bypass |
Communication Templates¶
Internal Stakeholder Update¶
RANSOMWARE INCIDENT UPDATE — [Date] [Time] UTC
Status: [Active Response / Negotiation / Recovery / Resolved]
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT STATUS:
- Encrypted systems: [X] of [Y] total
- Business operations: [Fully impacted / Partially impacted / Workarounds active]
- Recovery progress: [X]% of critical systems restored
- Negotiation status: [Engaged / Stalled / Resolved / Not pursuing]
ACTIONS SINCE LAST UPDATE:
- [Action 1]
- [Action 2]
NEXT STEPS:
- [Next action 1 — ETA]
- [Next action 2 — ETA]
NEXT UPDATE: [Date/Time]
Incident Commander: [Name]
Bridge: [Link/Number]
Customer/Partner Notification (Post Legal Review)¶
Subject: Security Incident Notification — [Organization Name]
Dear [Customer/Partner],
We are writing to inform you of a cybersecurity incident that [may have /
has] affected [description of impact].
WHAT HAPPENED:
On [date], we detected unauthorized activity in our systems. We immediately
activated our incident response procedures and engaged external
cybersecurity experts.
WHAT INFORMATION WAS INVOLVED:
[Description — be specific per legal/regulatory guidance]
WHAT WE ARE DOING:
- We have contained the incident and are restoring systems
- We have engaged law enforcement and are cooperating fully
- We have engaged third-party forensic investigators
- [Additional remediation steps]
WHAT YOU CAN DO:
- [Specific protective actions relevant to the data involved]
- [Contact information for questions]
We take the security of your information seriously and sincerely apologize
for any concern this may cause.
[Name], [Title]
[Organization]
[Incident hotline number]
Runbook Checklist¶
Demand Assessment¶
- [ ] IR-PB-001 containment confirmed complete
- [ ] Ransom demand documented (amount, currency, deadline, contact method)
- [ ] Threat actor intelligence gathered and cross-referenced
- [ ] OFAC/sanctions screening completed and documented
- [ ] Law enforcement notified (FBI IC3, CISA, local field office)
- [ ] Cyber insurance carrier notified
Negotiation¶
- [ ] External negotiation firm engaged (if proceeding)
- [ ] Communication protocol established (single point of contact)
- [ ] Parallel recovery options assessed and documented
- [ ] Proof of decryption capability requested and validated
- [ ] Decision checkpoints scheduled (12h, 24h, 48h, 72h)
Pay/Don't-Pay Decision¶
- [ ] Decision framework completed with all stakeholder input
- [ ] Executive briefing delivered
- [ ] Executive decision documented in writing
- [ ] Legal opinion documented (attorney-client privilege)
- [ ] Insurance coverage confirmed (if paying)
- [ ] Board notified (if material event)
Payment Execution (If Authorized)¶
- [ ] Cryptocurrency broker engaged
- [ ] Wallet address verified
- [ ] Payment executed and transaction documented
- [ ] Decryptor received and sandboxed for analysis
- [ ] Decryptor tested on isolated system — success confirmed
- [ ] Staged decryption plan executed
Recovery¶
- [ ] Systems restored in priority order
- [ ] Active Directory rebuilt or verified clean
- [ ] KRBTGT reset twice with 12h interval
- [ ] All privileged credentials rotated
- [ ] EDR verified on 100% of endpoints
- [ ] Network hardening measures deployed
Lessons Learned¶
- [ ] Complete attack timeline documented
- [ ] Regulatory notifications sent per tracker
- [ ] Insurance claim documentation assembled
- [ ] Post-incident review conducted within 2 weeks
- [ ] Backup strategy improvements implemented
- [ ] Detection and prevention gaps addressed
- [ ] Playbook updated with findings
Nexus SecOps Cross-References¶
| Topic | Resource |
|---|---|
| Ransomware deep dive | Chapter 23 — Ransomware Deep Dive |
| Incident response lifecycle | Chapter 9 — Incident Response Lifecycle |
| Advanced incident response | Chapter 28 — Advanced Incident Response |
| Digital forensics | Chapter 27 — Digital Forensics |
| Threat intelligence | Chapter 7 — Threat Intelligence Context |
| Threat actor encyclopedia | Chapter 22 — Threat Actor Encyclopedia |
| Security governance & privacy | Chapter 13 — Security Governance, Privacy & Risk |
| Initial ransomware response | IR-PB-001 — Ransomware Incident Playbook |
| Data breach response | IR-PB-006 — Data Breach Playbook |
Nexus SecOps Benchmark Control Mapping¶
| Control ID | Control Name | Playbook Phase |
|---|---|---|
| Nexus SecOps-RN-01 | Ransomware Negotiation Governance | Phase 1 — Demand Assessment |
| Nexus SecOps-RN-02 | OFAC/Sanctions Compliance Screening | Phase 1 — Demand Assessment |
| Nexus SecOps-RN-03 | External Negotiation Engagement | Phase 2 — Negotiation Strategy |
| Nexus SecOps-RN-04 | Executive Pay/Don't-Pay Decision Framework | Phase 3 — Decision Gate |
| Nexus SecOps-RN-05 | Cryptocurrency Payment Controls | Phase 4 — Payment Execution |
| Nexus SecOps-RN-06 | Post-Ransom Recovery & Regulatory Compliance | Phase 6 — Lessons Learned |